Moral and social reasons to acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts by unknown
DEBATE Open Access
Moral and social reasons to acknowledge
the use of cognitive enhancers in
competitive-selective contexts
Mirko D. Garasic1* and Andrea Lavazza2
Abstract
Background: Although some of the most radical hypothesis related to the practical implementations of human
enhancement have yet to become even close to reality, the use of cognitive enhancers is a very tangible phenomenon
occurring with increasing popularity in university campuses as well as in other contexts. It is now well documented that
the use of cognitive enhancers is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a
normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it
has its peak in colleges (where the trend has been characterized as “academic doping”). Even when certain restrictions in
the legislation of a country are indeed in place (i.e. through prescriptions requirements), they are without doubts easy to
overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of our investigation.
Discussion: Our concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive
enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western
society: it is a fact that an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders
using cognitive enhancers.
Summary: Through the use of five explicative examples, in this paper we want to analyse the problems related to its use.
In particular, it will be our aim to show the tension between one of the main argument used by bio-liberals (the use of
cognitive enhancers is an eligible procedure that society does not impose on anyone) and the actual implementation of
the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts.
Keywords: Cognitive enhancement, Privacy, Performance-enhancing substances, Moral duty, Autonomy, Public interest
Background
The use of cognitive enhancers seems to be growing in
several competitive contexts, such as schools, universities,
firms and even the army (though its use in the latter con-
text is certainly less surprising as soldiers have been his-
torically prone to function as “guinea pigs” for a number
of enhancers destined to eventually benefit civilians [1, 2].
This phenomenon has triggered a significant debate in
philosophy and bioethics [3–8], and has received an in-
creasing attention from the media, a fact that highlights
the social relevance of the issue [9–14]. The situation is
made even more complex by the non-univocal definition
of what an enhancer is and, more specifically, what a
cognitive enhancer is. In general, Cognitive Enhancers
(CE) are not new to our society. Caffeine and nicotine are
largely accepted as legitimate ways to help us be more
focused, stay awake and be more productive. But medita-
tion, yoga and a good night sleep are also things we could
do to enhance our performance. So how to define a cogni-
tive enhancer?
It seems reasonable to stress that there are substantial
differences between the natural enhancers we just men-
tioned and the newer ones, which this paper intends to
focus on. First of all, large doses of caffeine and nicotine
do not provide the high level of focus that would be typ-
ical of specific modern CE – in other words, the “peak”
of the performance is not comparable to that sought
through the use of methylphenidate and Modafinil, for
instance [15–17]. It should be pointed out that, despite
their increasing use, there is still not robust evidence
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that methylphenidate and Modafinil provide effective
cognitive enhancement [18–21]. Yet, given the demand
and the ongoing research, it is not unreasonable to as-
sume that similar effective drugs will be available soon.
Furthermore, the common and prescription-free avail-
ability of caffeine and nicotine might suggest that an
implicit moral assessment over their use has already
passed the scrutiny of Western society, at least in terms
of their enhancing features, while the same cannot be
said of the new ones. However, this is not the generally
used criterion. For instance, Khat (a natural stimulant
drug) does not require prescription, although its differ-
ent status is due to the fact that no moral assessment
has been conducted in Western societies – perhaps also
because of the “cultural aspect” related to it, since cer-
tain ethnic groups traditionally use it [22]. In contrast,
intensive use of caffeine and, obviously, nicotine has
been discouraged mainly for medical reasons or, more
rarely, in order to contrast a more general inclination to-
wards vices [23–25]. Yet, the use of caffeine and nicotine
is not reproached in competitive contexts.
Here our aim is to focus on a specific category of
enhancers, which, as we shall see, might lead to several
problems if their use were widespread. For those en-
hancers, therefore, there might be the need to set rules
and boundaries, both moral and legal. We are referring to
Pharmaceutical Cognitive Enhancers (PCE): substances
able to improve some cognitive functions due to their
action on the biochemical balance of the brain [26–28].
More specifically, PCE may act on the subject’s attention,
alertness, executive functioning (planning, problem-solving
and inhibition), memory and learning. In this way, PCE
can improve performance in study and work by increasing
concentration, motivation and accuracy. The substances
most commonly included in the set of PCE are drugs used
off-label by healthy people who do not have specific
deficits but want to improve their standards of intellec-
tual and cognitive performance [29–36]. Recent studies
have focused particularly on Modafinil [21, 37], stres-
sing how its enhancing nature at neurological level
differs significantly from that of substances such as
nicotine or caffeine. The substances that are currently
most widely used (and deemed to be the most effective)
are those marketed for the treatment of neurodegenera-
tive disorders, ADHD and narcolepsy [38–40]. Thus,
caffeine and nicotine, as well as other forms of en-
hancement, are excluded from the domain of PCE. The
argument we will propose, however, is likely to be
extended to several forms of cognitive enhancement,
whether chemical or in the form of technological
devices or implants.
PCE can be acquired through unofficial or illegal chan-
nels, overcoming the restrictions that many countries
have set on their sale. For example, a report published in
August 2015 [41] by the Federal Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration affirms that
roughly 137,000 American college students start abusing
prescription stimulants each year. Moreover, the report
shows a peak usage of such substances (no specific PCE
are named) in periods of the year associated with key
moments in the academic year. The legitimacy and
appropriateness of such restrictions has been discussed
elsewhere [42, 43] and will not be the focus of the
present investigation. Our concern here is different. Our
premise is that PCE use, in principle, could be regarded
as legally permissible and morally acceptable.
Currently, the United Nations Convention on Psycho-
tropic Substances [44] “defines the schedules for potentially
dangerous psychotropic substances and explicitly lists
methylphenidate as a Schedule II drug (which includes
controlled substances with known medical uses). All coun-
tries that have ratified this Convention are obligated to
regulate methylphenidate accordingly. Thus, the legal sanc-
tions related to ‘study aid’ use, depending on the jurisdic-
tion, might even include liability to imprisonment if
methylphenidate is sold to, or shared with, others.
Modafinil did not exist when the international legal
framework was established and is not mentioned in the
Convention’s schedules. Partly as a consequence of this,
the controls around Modafinil vary enormously from
country to country” [45].
Thus, the legal permissibility of these drugs could be
supported by a liberal principle whereby the State should
not interfere with its adult citizens’ choices as long as
they do not damage third parties. In addition to this, it
can be argued that cognitive performance enhancement
is usually both an individual choice and a contribution
to the wellbeing of society. The latter is obtained, for
instance, through the enhancement of some professional
performances, which could be an advantage for every-
one. For example, surgeons could improve their practices
and outcomes thanks to enhanced attention, working
memory and self-control [46].
Moral acceptability, on the other hand, is connected to
at least two general arguments. First of all, PCE are not
qualitatively different from other common elements (from
social contexts to schools of excellence) that enhance
cognitive performance. These methods – even though po-
tentially available to everyone – are as unequally distrib-
uted and accessible as PCE. Our second argument for
moral acceptability has to do with the liberal perspective
(prevailing today for a range of reasons that we cannot
analyse here) which favours individual autonomy and self-
determination. Within such a political scheme (the assess-
ment of the validity of such a political approach goes
beyond the scope of this paper) that allows -and to an
extent encourages- various methods of self-creation, we
argue that PCE do not constitute a less morally acceptable
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method than other individuo-centred ones tolerated by
Western societies.
We will not analyse these premises extensively (even
though they are not universally shared) as we would like
to concentrate on a specific point: namely, that in many
competitive and working contexts there are moral and
social reasons to acknowledge the use of cognitive
enhancers.
In this paper we will argue that these reasons are not
strong enough to hinder the legal permissibility and
moral acceptability of PCE. In fact, to prohibit their use
would mean to go against individual freedom and reduce
the benefits that they would bring to both the individual
and the society. These effects cannot be justified by the
problems caused by cognitive enhancement. However,
introducing a duty of disclosure could be a good way to
regulate PCE use, constituting a more confined limita-
tion of freedom than prohibiting it completely. PCE use
in specific contexts can be justified by the benefits that
it would give, and the implementation of the disclosure
duty could be realized with the same legal tools as a ban,
without having its freedom limitations.
Main text
Cognitive enhancement and public interest
There are arguments in favour of the use of “smart
drugs”, while others are completely against it [47].
Broadly speaking, the two positions have been defined in
different ways depending on the context, but for the
purpose of the present investigation – without going
into further detail for lack of space – we will limit our-
selves to calling bio-liberal those supporting the use of
PCE and bio-conservative those against it [48]. Given the
general mistrust in the enhancement project by the lat-
ter, for the purpose of the present work we will only
focus on the former. This choice is due to two reasons:
first, some restrictions to PCE use are more of a chal-
lenge for bio-liberals than for bio-conservatives, because
bio-conservatives are by definition inclined towards a
full-scale rejection of enhancers. Second, the bio-liberal
paradigm seems to be more consistent with a pluralistic
society such as ours, since it does not presuppose strong
positions about human nature and leaves room for
people to autonomously decide which principles to fol-
low. If bio-liberals are persuaded to introduce some
form of regulation, the latter will be all the more justi-
fied in the eyes of bio-conservatives, who are against
enhancement. In this sense, there is no need for bio-
conservatives to accept bio-liberal assumptions. In fact,
the specific point here is that of the duty of disclosure.
Bio-conservatives may find it too bland or insufficient,
but they probably would not object to it as such, as they
too think it might be better than a total deregulation. In
line with this view, the liberal paradigm conventionally
accepts that anyone can autonomously decide what
substance to take and how, as long as this does not
damage others – it could also be hypothesized that cog-
nitive enhancement does not jeopardize the fairness of
competition any more than many other techniques or
socio-economical conditions that are generally seen as
unproblematic [49, 50]. For example, some students may
attend expensive public schools while others cannot.
Some would-be lawyers or managers may meet influen-
tial people thanks to their familiar relationships while
others cannot, and so on.
Within such paradigm, we think it is reasonable to
argue in favour of a moderate liberal position implying a
moral and social duty to declare the use (or non-use) of
cognitive enhancements. We will suggest that it could
prevent certain forms of harm to single individuals or
even society as a whole. It is interesting to note that in
the recent report of the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Bioethical Issues (PCSBI) [51] -issued to give
recommendations on the ethical use of medications and
other types of “neural modification”- PCE have been
integrated with other kinds of “neural interventions” such
as deep brain stimulation, for instance. However, out of
simplicity for both our argument and the availability and
the implementation of the procedures, we will only focus
on PCE in this occasion. Moreover, another of our prem-
ises is that, differently from previous accounts [7, 29, 52],
we conceive of the use of enhancers as a responsible
behaviour: it should not jeopardize the freedom or rights
of others nor go against the public interest.
Our claim that PCE use should be disclosed is also
due to equity reasons: especially in the future, PCE could
allow for a much greater and quicker performance en-
hancement than any other presently existent technique,
so that PCE users would be much more advantaged
compared to non-users. In addition to this, while other
“pre-existing inequalities” are often evident, public, or
simply investigable, cognitive enhancement by means of
a pill would likely remain “secret”. In this sense, there
can be reasons related to authenticity [53] and transpar-
ency to be set against the respect for individual privacy.
However, the fact remains that establishing an obligation
to report the use of PCE seems to run against the liberal
framework that we have just outlined. In particular, this
duty seems opposed to the notions of autonomy and
privacy involved in the liberal framework. Therefore, it is
important to clarify in more detail the role of autonomy
and privacy in our argument.
Autonomy and privacy
Even though there are several definitions of it, the con-
cept of autonomy “is generally understood to refer to
the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life ac-
cording to reasons and motivations that are taken as
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one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distort-
ing external forces” [54]. Those who are autonomous can
decide for themselves without interference from others or
personal limitations preventing significant choices; they
can act according to a plan of their own, designed without
constrictions. Autonomy also concerns the freedom to de-
cide what to believe in and to weigh the pros and cons of
a given course of action. Another fundamental element
regards the awareness of the rules one establishes and fol-
lows. A central role in this is played by rational reflection,
or the ability to assess existing traditions and norms of
conduct, as well as the capability of choosing – with the
necessary emotional detachment – which ones to follow
and which to ignore. This specific version of autonomy is
often defined as competence in medical-legal contexts. We
could say, in other words, that being autonomous means
being aware of the outcome of one’s deliberations and
being driven by one’s own purposes. Being autonomous
means being oneself, being driven by considerations,
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are part of
what can be considered the authentic self – which, as
such, becomes an irrefutable value. 1
The concept of privacy generally regards the protection
of a space of non-interference, based on a principle of
“inviolate personality” which – as Warren and Brandeis
famously stated [55] – is a part of a general right of
immunity of the person. Indeed, privacy limits the intru-
sion into a person’s seclusion or solitude or into her pri-
vate affairs. The right to privacy seems to prevent the
public disclosure of embarrassing facts as well as publicly
putting one in a bad light [56]. We argue that, if others
can enter your own sphere, even just to see it, this poten-
tially affects your own freedom of action, because being
“observed” implies giving the others an advantage over us,
thus creating an asymmetry between us and them, and
generally binding and limiting us. The right to privacy
thus seems an essential correlate of autonomy, which, as
we have noted, is the preferred framework of liberal
societies.
In the current cultural climate, adults above a certain
threshold of competence are always presumed to be
autonomous and to have the obligation to respect that
autonomy. So, whenever one intervenes against an individ-
ual’s will or violates their privacy, one is also disrespecting
that individual as a person. But then, is it possible to iden-
tify a principle that goes against individual privacy in the
case of PCE? Is the use of PCE related to morality and the
public interest? We will try to show that it is, also by
means of a few examples.
Unfairness and composition effects: some reasons to
disclose the use of PCE
In order to support the duty of disclosure of PCE use,
one must first of all clarify what properties they usually
or at least frequently present, in accordance to what was
found in the literature. Namely, “the enhancer has acute
and/or chronic effects. In the first case, shortly after
taking the drug the performance is significantly better
than average; in the second case, there is a growing or
lasting effect, which, however, is set to diminish when
one stops taking the drug; those effects are significant
(there is a visible difference between taking and not
taking the drug) and sometimes dramatic; a third fea-
ture, not directly related to enhancers as such, is their
varying safety, availability, and legal permissibility, which
might either induce people to take them or refrain them
from doing so”. 2 Recent reviews [57, 58] raise some doubts
about the properties attributed to the PCE available today
and by this fact conclude that the diffusion of enhancers
should not constitute a particular social problem.
We think this is only partially true, since researchers are
always looking for new and more effective techniques. A
recent discovery regards a possible mechanism to make
an adult brain as plastic as a child’s, which is more apt to
form new synapses. The key is a protein present in brain
cells known as PirB in the animal models. The main func-
tion of PirB is that of stabilizing neural connections. But
this protection also makes them more rigid and less able
to acquire new skills and information. By interfering with
the normal function of PirB, it seems possible to quickly
induce new neural connections in adult brains, which is a
way to enhance cognitive processes, since one can learn
more rapidly than usually, provided that scientists find a
safe way to knock out the human variant of the molecule,
called LilrB2 [59].
Moreover, a recent qualitative study showed that Adder-
all affect intellectual capacities like executive functions,
working memory and information processing, but their
use is also associated with significant changes in the user’s
emotional states, which are as relevant as the cognitive
ones. “Such alterations appear to be an important dimen-
sion of the drug effects that users perceive to enable
improved academic performance” [26]. Participants said
that a better emotional or affective state was the most
important effect of the enhancers. According to this study,
participants reported “feeling up”, a general increase in
their energy levels (both physical and mental) and a strong
sense of well-being; “drivenness”, a strong need to do
something, as if they suddenly had extra energy; a strong
desire to achieve a goal, or to complete a task; “interested-
ness”, enhanced abilities to become emotionally invested
in issues related to their work, the perception of caring
about those issues; and “enjoyment”, experiencing their
work as a pleasurable activity. Feeling up was also de-
scribed as “upness”: both energization and mood improve-
ment. Drivenness was perceived as an internal push,
pressure or motivation to get started with one’s work and
to keep on it steadily, through interestedness.
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One can therefore claim that the PCE’s emotional im-
pact is one of the reasons for their use. As the authors of
the quoted study openly admit, the fact that PCE can
change one’s emotional state is “part of what makes stimu-
lant drugs useful in relation to academic work” [26]. How-
ever, there is evidence that Ritalin and Adderall have a
strong effect on the dopaminergic system: they influence
attention, the system of pleasure and that of emotions,
causing a euphoric effect [27, 28]. It should also be noted
that, if cognitive enhancers are so popular in academia
and school, it probably means that students and professors
aim at feeling something relevant, which might not be
only a cognitive effect [60].
Combining strictly cognitive effects with emotional-
motivational ones, the overall effect of these off-label medi-
cations is very strong. Aside from the well-known “rat-race”
argument [61] focused on showing the structural limits of
the idea of being better thanks to PCE – as well as their
intrinsic subordination to peer-pressure inputs [62] – there
is another important issue that needs attention, which lies
at the heart of our argument: the fairness towards the
“unenhanced” and the potentially dysfunctional social
consequences of undisclosed PCE use.
Indeed, two lines of argument can be proposed to sup-
port the need to disclose the use of PCE. The first has to
do with the idea of fairness. Within the context of
personal autonomy that we have chosen, it is defined as
follows. In a competitive environment, where only one
candidate gets the prize (say, a scholarship or a job),
each participant is encouraged to try to improve their
performance in the way they deem most effective, pro-
vided it complies with the rules in place, which are pre-
sumably known to all participants. The assumption of
PCE, however, would be an extrinsic reinforcement whose
effects are “hidden” and unlikely to be known by the other
participants. A participant’s pharmaceutical cognitive en-
hancement would alter the initial situation of equality –
which, however, could be easily amended by disclosing the
use of PCE. In this case, the reference to the parity thesis
[63] does not seem to apply, as PCE appear to be qualita-
tively different from common stimulants such as caffeine
or nicotine. According to the parity thesis, which can be
summed up with the expression “nothing new”, the simple
fact that there is innovative technology, capable of direct
intervention on the brain through neuroscientific know-
ledge, should not necessarily lead us to think that there
will be significant or unheard-of problems. However, as
we said earlier, there does not seem to be any analogy
between stimulants such as caffeine and tobacco, and new
molecules used to increase attention and concentration
skills (for example, Modafinil and Adderall). The main
difference is the targeted use people make of new mole-
cules, and their action that, while still being under discus-
sion, seems to be more effective [64]. In any case, the
argument is also aimed to consider future developments
in pharmacology, possibly leading to a more marked
difference in quality and quantity of new generation stim-
ulants compared to caffeine. The specificity of PCE also
emerges from the fact that cognitive enhancement
through specific types of PCE was proposed as compul-
sory for those engaged in professions which the entire
community benefits from (e.g., surgeons, airline pilots)
[46]. In that case, there would have been a duty to declare
the use of PCE to control the quality standard of the
professionals.
Finally, the effect of these substances varies depending
on the subject, also in function of the dosage and other
factors related to the context of use [30, 65]. In our
opinion, there is a realistic risk that a reasonably high
number of individuals -not knowing what drugs other
people use- would be tempted to buy and use everything
is available, given that competitors could use those drugs
as well. There would thus be a random and disruptive
effect over the performance of the participants, under-
mining the equality of opportunities.
The second line of argument is part of a consequen-
tialist framework, as it refers to the potential compos-
ition effects of an undeclared use of PCE by many
individuals. This argument supports the thesis that there
is a social duty to declare cognitive enhancement. As we
shall see, there are situations in which some researchers,
workers or students who secretly use PCE can be con-
sidered more skilled and better at performing their task
than they really are. But this is not the main problem
per se. The potentially dysfunctional social consequences
of PCE use are due to its being undisclosed. If an indi-
vidual does not have her drug dose available, she will
not be capable of the same performance as usual and, in
some professions, might even put her colleagues at risk.
If standards are set based on PCE-using workers, this
may lead to an organizational dysfunction. In this case,
the relative lack of respect for individual autonomy and
privacy can be justified by utilitarian criteria. In fact, the
benefit that the individual seeks in PCE could be made
vain by the general negative consequences caused by the
widespread use of PCE. The idea is that one should give
up part of your autonomy/privacy for the sake of your
group’s greater overall wellbeing.
We argue that in the relevant contexts – like open
competitive exams, recruitment, high performance pro-
fessions or public responsibility (from doctors to pilots
and firemen) – preventive measures similar to those
employed to forbid the use of specific substances should
be implemented. In particular, we think the duty to dis-
close PCE use should be included among those rules
that, if not followed, lead to disqualification. In addition
to this, spot checks and other surveillance measures
could be implemented to ensure that everyone who uses
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PCE communicates it to the relevant people in charge
(examination boards, employers and supervisors). Such
surveillance measures could include productivity indexes
to evaluate anomalous variations, periodic or surprise
blood tests, the ability to test the required skills even
outside working hours. The mere possibility of imple-
menting such surveillance measures, combined with
sanctions, would likely lead to respecting the duty of dis-
closure. In this way the disclosure of PCE use would not
become totally public and would have the advantage of
limiting the restriction of individual privacy while gain-
ing the maximum benefit for society as a whole.
The notion of PCE use duty of disclosure derives from
the consideration that there can be conflicting rights.
On the one hand there is the right of society to have
vital services efficient and fair competitive conditions in
some contexts that have consequences on the commu-
nity. On the other hand, there are the rights of individ-
uals to have their privacy and their autonomy protected.
Compared to prohibition, the duty of disclosure seems
to maintain the interests of society at the price of a
smaller reduction of PCE consumer rights.
The idea of non-public disclosure means that not all
have to know that an individual uses PCE, neither in the
event that he can continue to take them in controlled
conditions nor in cases he should suspend the assump-
tion due to social needs (see examples below). In any
organized situation, there are people who have the re-
sponsibility, according to coded procedures, to select
and control staff. Only they can and must be aware of
the disclosure required on schedule. The lack of com-
munication, once discovered, could be a right cause for
sanction or dismissal. In state organizations or profes-
sions in the public interest, which are already regulated
by state laws (for instance, the medical profession), it is
conceivable that there should be a legal enforcement,
explicitly provided for, precisely on the grounds that are
exposed in this paper. Periodic checks explicitly pro-
grammed in the form of anti-doping tests such as those
used in sports, could be a fair method of implementation
of the duty of disclosure. Obviously, these measures
relate to substances that are not already explicitly pro-
hibited, as the latter are regulated by the laws that
already exist. However, periodic inspections could not be
sufficient. One could hypothesize introducing spot checks,
but these raise greater objections related to individual
privacy and autonomy.
The duty of disclosure can be compared with other
types of discourage-use policies on PCE. In particular,
for non-prohibited substances, one can introduce mon-
etary incentives not to use PCE without asking to reveal
their use. Or one can increase the taxation on legal PCE
to decrease their use without prohibiting them and with-
out violating individual privacy. This measure seems to
limit privacy and autonomy to a lesser extent, but is
avoidable by purchasing PCE outside legal channels and,
therefore, less effective. Monetary incentives are costly
and do not guarantee compliance, especially in cases
where the performance of the professional depends at
least partly on the PCE. The fact that there are two dis-
tinct and convergent arguments related to PCE seems to
indicate that the issue at stake is important. In this vein,
we will now propose some compelling and realistic
examples related to organizational and institutional con-
texts. These examples highlight the argument for the
(moral and socially relevant) duty to disclose the use of
PCE, insofar as it is sufficiently harmful or unfair to
third parties (though not sufficiently harmful or unfair
to justify a legal ban).
Example 1
During a public competition for the recruitment of
senior civil servants, only a few candidates are left for
the final selection. The last exam consists of an inter-
view during which the candidates have to pass several
tests. None of the candidates know the nature of these
tests, but flair and self-confidence are said to be particu-
larly appreciated. If there are no rules regarding PCE,
each candidate will be tempted to take a cognitive
enhancer that works in the short-term in addition to
other mood-altering drugs, in particular tranquilizers
and those that bring on euphoria. Since each candidate
believes the exam to be decisive, they are likely to be
tempted to use the most powerful drugs available (let us
say, for sake of argument, Aniracetam), at the upper
bounds of the suggested dose. Perhaps someone may be
tempted to take an extra dose to beat the other candi-
dates, putting his or her health at risk. Additionally, the
self-assuredness and other performance enhancements
brought about by a heavy dose of PCE during the
recruitment process will not match the average level of
performance that the candidate will be able to ensure
after being hired.
This harms society, because it leads to selecting a civil
servant whose expected performance does not match his
or her actual performance, while other candidates could
have been more efficient. If instead each candidate were
required, prior to the interview, to declare what drugs
they expect to take, then the recruitment commission
would have all the necessary information for an exhaust-
ive assessment (of course, some candidates could cheat
with regards to the drugs, but to offset this, some sort of
surprise drug test could be introduced). 3 Knowing what
PCE are taken by some candidates would allow everyone
to act in order to ensure they have the same opportun-
ities while not putting their health at risk. Indeed, if
someone were to decide to take excessive doses or use
dangerous substances, the other candidates would be
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free not to do the same. This would prevent an “arms
race” that would be morally inequitable, dangerous at
the individual level, and inefficient at the social level.
Example 2
Steve and Laura work for the same company in the Silicon
Valley. They have a similar background and play a similar
role at work. When the head of their department switches
to another company, this opens the possibility for one of
them to fill the vacancy. The company chooses to carry
out an internal competition to decide who between Steve
and Laura is the best candidate for the post of head of
department. Steve and Laura are granted a two-week
vacation to study and prepare for the best. They do not
know how the test will take place and assume it is a trad-
itional examination. The company has decided instead to
evaluate both the content of the answers and the speed at
which the candidates give those answers. Before the exam,
Steve takes a 15 mg Adderall tab in order to improve his
cognitive performance during the test. To be fair, he offers
the same tab to Laura, but she refuses to take an enhan-
cer. At the end of the examination, the post is given to
Steve. In fact, Steve answered fewer questions, but was
much faster than Laura. The company’s decision is due to
the fact that it wants both competence and quick thinking.
Laura is very upset: she thinks that the decision is very
unfair. If she had taken Adderall, her speed in responding
would have been comparable to Steve’s and therefore
would have got the job. Laura therefore asks Steve to
confess that he was under a PCE. Steve, however, refuses.
He first argues that he had given Laura the opportunity to
use a PCE herself, but she chose not to take the enhancer.
Second, Steve points out that there is no requirement to
disclose the use of PCE. Otherwise, why has Laura not
revealed that she had been drinking a lot of coffee before
the exam? 4 Here, it would appear as if the duty to disclose
the use of PCE would be useful to reintroduce a neutral
judge in the assessment of the ability of the two otherwise
morally sound candidates. The establishment of a clear
way of evaluating the enhancers will be accepted by both
individuals –as they both believe to be right. Speculations
related to a number of aspects of the example are relevant
of course (i.e. in the US, Adam’s offer to Eve could be a
punishable offense, with a legal sanction of up to 2 years
in prison depending on the specific state), 5 but we urge
the readers to leave momentarily aside these practical real-
ities of how the law is currently dealing with PCE, to focus
instead on the interpersonal impact that the undisclosed
use of them could and does have in competitive contexts
and imagine that, for the sake of the argument, this
example takes place in a country where the use of Adderall
is legal. Yet, our examples aim at being as universal as pos-
sible, so we believe that including some specific variables
of one country over another would be counterproductive
for a global analysis of the issues at stake. The main issue
raised in the example is the fact that PCE use affects
certain aspects of recruitment tests, such as the speed in
responding, but not others, such as knowledge of a specific
subject. One could get around this problem by changing
the tests so as to give less importance to the aspects influ-
enced by PCE, but that would mean changing a process
that in normal conditions has proved effective, and it
would be costly. The duty of disclosure of PCE use, instead,
solves the problem in a much more cost-effective way.
Example 3
Sumeet has always wanted to help his neighbour. As a
boy he wanted to be a doctor, but his family could not
afford to pay the university fee. So, after high school,
Sumeet decided to work in the public ambulance ser-
vice. Sumeet has never been very good at school, but he
thinks he could be a great ambulance driver, thus help-
ing to save many lives. The selection for the job involves
a written test, which worries him a lot. Talking with a
friend he learns about Ritalin, which is not prohibited
and could help him pass the test. Sumeet, however,
knows that the purchase of Ritalin requires prescription.
The friend then comes to his aid, and gives him the tabs.
Sumeet, hoping they will help him focus and be sharper,
takes them before the written test. The examination goes
well and Sumeet chooses to use the remaining tablets in
the oral test, at which he performs very well. He is then
hired as an ambulance driver.
Sumeet realizes that if he continues to take Ritalin
when in service, his driving performance will be better.
One evening, just when Sumeet has run out of Ritalin,
there is a terrorist attack in his city. Without Ritalin,
Sumeet feels weak both on the psychological and on the
physical level: his reflexes are slower, and in one case he
even takes the wrong way. The doctor with him sees that
there is something wrong and tries to reassure him.
Sumeet is thus able to complete his shift without causing
major damage. But his supervisor scolds him: certainly
he could have done much more, given the standards he
had shown previously. So Sumeet, who thinks he has
nothing to hide, reveals the cause of his poor perform-
ance. On hearing this, his supervisor gets extremely
angry. Not only did Sumeet “cheat” the exam, but above
all he put at great risk the injured and the ambulance
doctors. The supervisor should know whom to count on
in difficult times. And if a driver varies its performance
according to the PCE he takes or does not take without
the knowledge of his colleagues, then the whole team
work can be severely compromised. Sumeet is then fired,
but he does not understand why: he thinks that he only
took Ritalin to do his job better. 6
One could argue that the problem here is mainly
linked to Sumeet’s lack of information on the effects of
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Ritalin, and that therefore the solution to the problem
comes especially from providing publicly accessible
information [66]. In fact, as in any human activity, it is
unrealistic to think that all people are always perfectly
informed. Therefore, the duty of disclosure is to offset
this potential lack of information. The duty of disclosure
of PCE use would obviously be a way to convey informa-
tion, because, as mentioned earlier, the breach would
have significant consequences for the worker. Therefore,
the worker would be likely motivated to make detailed
inquiries regarding the rules on the use of PCE, which
presumably she would not do otherwise. Also, those
who knew that Sumeet uses Ritalin could inform him of
the risks and consequences of it. So this would create a
situation where the amount of information available is
greater, because the controllers would be informed about
Sumeet’s condition and Sumeet would be informed
about what Ritalin can do.
Example 4
An important goal for a school system is to provide
equal opportunities to students in any region of their
country. To do this one needs to evaluate schools in
different areas to find out if and where to intervene to
improve quality so as to bring all areas to the level of
other ones. To this purpose, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development performs sample
tests on students in many countries. One of the means
to measure the students’ skills and knowledge is the
Programme for Student Assessment (PSA). Imagine the
situation that might arise in the classroom where stu-
dents are old enough to legally take cognitive enhancers.
Even if the tests are anonymous for individual students,
the result of the classes or schools is known. Teachers
could then push their students to take PCE so as to per-
form well and the teachers themselves look good. As
mentioned, cognitive enhancers do not improve the
intelligence nor allow one to answer a question one does
not know the answer to.
However, the PCE may improve test performance and
make it so that in certain schools or in certain regions of
the country there are high scores that do not correspond
to the quality of the teaching methods or the actual
ability of the students. Consequently, the data would not
be correctly interpreted and no efficient decision could
be taken on their basis (it should be remembered that
these are sample tests and therefore few classes can be
used to judge the level of preparation of an entire
region). The results thus distorted by the use of PCE
could lead authorities to extend the teaching methods of
the well-performing schools, as they would be consid-
ered the most effective when in fact they are no better
than others. Thus many resources would be wasted and
really effective teaching methods would be neglected. A
further consequence would be the lack of action in
favour of schools or areas where economic or social defi-
ciencies should be remedied to improve the quality of
education, but where, because of the use of PCE, it
seems that school results are good and that therefore
there is no need for any state intervention. In this case,
there would appear to be both a moral duty and a social
interest in reporting the use of PCE. Indeed, the use of
PCE could be deemed fully legitimate and, if openly
reported, it could become an additional element in the
assessment of instruments suitable for improving school
performance (that is, the main purpose of the tests in
question). By knowing what classes, in what geographic
areas, took cognitive enhancers, it will be possible to
assess their effectiveness without introducing biases in
the overall results.
This is of social interest as it helps with the efficient
allocation of resources. In fact, there also seems to be a
moral duty, since teachers who encouraged their stu-
dents to take PCE without reporting it might be trying
to hide their shortcomings as educators. Instead, taking
PCE unbeknownst to evaluators may result in the failure
to identify situations of economic or cultural distress,
because school performance has improved only thanks
to the use of cognitive enhancers. In other words,
teachers or students from the schools chosen for sample
testing in a given region may be trying to portray them-
selves in a positive light, but by doing so they would
cause harm to all the other schools in the region, where
school performance is poor and investments on the part
of the state are surely needed.
It could be argued that the students’ use of PCE is
positive for society, as it increases the stock of efficiency
of the entire community [67]. This might be true if PCE
use were made compulsory, which seems to have strong
contraindications in itself [68]. If the use was only
allowed without the duty of disclosure, so that some
classes would have many users and others just a few,
there would be the problems that we have highlighted in
this example. In other words, the fact that teachers can
skew the results of a few school classes chosen as a sam-
ple, thanks to the use of PCE recommended to their stu-
dents, may lead to erroneous assessments of entire
school districts, with the consequent allocation of re-
sources on the basis of results which do not correspond
to the actual level of overall preparation of the students.
Example 5
In some cases, a candidate for a job may resort to the
use of cognitive enhancers to increase his performance
in tests and interviews. In particular, the candidate in
question may resort to drugs that would raise his mood
(such as fluoxetine) and/or real enhancers that would
improve single aspects of his cognitive functioning. In
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these situations, as it often happens, tests and interviews
may not be targeted to the specific task that the candi-
date will have to perform, but only to assess his/her
general skills, both because of the difficulty of making a
targeted selection and because of the choice to hire “gen-
erally good” staff to train later according to specific needs.
There are two problems that can arise in such cases.
Firstly, attention-increasing neuro-stimulators seem to
have the side effect of decreasing creativity and/or other
mental functions [63]. Evidence shows an inverse relation-
ship between concentration and creativity, understood as
the ability to find new, alternative ways to tackle a task
that requires a solution. The hiring organization would
therefore be selecting an employee who might have a
performance-related imbalance induced by enhancers
(besides, after the selection he could be induced to keep
taking them so as to maintain the standards with which
he passed the selection process). The company could
not resort to the candidate’s real strengths, risking
entrusting him with an unsuitable task.
Secondly, the use of a cosmetic pharmacology of a
euphoric kind, especially at high doses, tends to produce
a professional conduct characterized by optimism, over-
estimation of one’s own abilities and underestimation of
the risks – regardless of data [69–71]. This can produce
a professional figure that may be likeable in the early
stages but, in the long run, is likely to be counterpro-
ductive and even dangerous. One example is that of
financial operators, but also surgeons and all workers
who are in the control of safety equipment. While, ad-
mittedly, a depressive personality is just as dysfunctional
as regards these tasks, the supervisors’ knowledge of the
worker’s mood-improving drug use would give more ele-
ments for a better distribution of tasks and responsibilities
in the workplace, with a positive impact not only for the
specific organization but also for society as a whole.
Discussion
To sum up, the five examples we made are aimed to
illustrate various situations in which the duty of disclos-
ure can help solve problematic issues. In Example 1,
public competitions for recruitment of civil servants
might be affected by the fact that only some candidates
have taken PCE. In this way, it may happen that the re-
cruiter would select the latter people and not those who
are actually best fit for the job. The duty of disclosure
might solve this problem without resorting to a ban of
PCE. In Example 2, we have shown how interpersonal
competition can be affected by PCE, in that they influ-
ence certain aspects (such as quick responses) but not
others (such as knowledge). The duty of disclosure can
avoid this risk. In Example 3, the duty of disclosure
induces people to know more about the effects of PCE
use, especially for those whose profession affects others
in a direct and significant way. Also, it helps to avoid
dangerous situations due to poor performance on the
part of PCE users when they are not on PCE – in such
situations, in fact, their superiors or their colleagues
would not be able to intervene as they would not be
aware of the workers’ habitual PCE use. In Example 4,
the situation shown in Example 1 has much more
serious social effects, because if students chosen as a
sample to assess the school system make use of PCE,
this can lead to allocate public resources in a way that
does not reflect the truth. Once again, the duty of
disclosure might solve this problem. Finally, Example
5 recalls Example 1 but magnifies the potential prob-
lems related to recruitment in cases of undisclosed
PCE use. In fact, someone hired while on PCE could
be expected to always perform in a way that actually
depends on their PCE use. Also, PCE accentuate cer-
tain traits that may cause workers to overestimate
their own capabilities, with disastrous effects on their
performance, which in many cases will have conse-
quences on the public. The duty of disclosure avoids
these distortions.
The purpose of these examples is to underline the tension
between the individual’s use of PCE and some practical
problems related to a concealed use of such enhancers in a
liberal society. 7 Unintentional consequences, in fact, may
produce sub-optimal situations for society as a whole.
Our point is to underline overlooked difficulties within
the debate on smart drugs. Although on the one hand
the unrestricted use of PCE preserves the principle of
personal autonomy that (at least at the theoretical level)
should be given priority in liberal societies, on the other
hand, the consequences – be they intentional or not –
can lead to unfair outcomes or social situations that
clash against some other principles dear to liberalism. In
particular, as noted above, there may be limitations to
the principle of equal opportunities. Also, the use of
PCE in complex social contexts is likely to produce
unequal or dysfunctional results for the group. Thus –
based on the realistic examples that we provided – one
might justify the practice of posing some limitations to
personal autonomy related to the use of PCE through a
restriction of the subject’s privacy in competitive con-
texts. Indeed, if one has to reveal to controllers that one
makes use of PCE, this disclosure may have conse-
quences: increased surveillance by one’s superiors, a
request to use or not to use PCE in certain situations, or
even a different view of one’s work. This is obviously a
limitation of one’s autonomy as a person who wants to
manage their work performance without interference,
albeit within a general regulatory framework.
The legitimacy of introducing a duty of disclosure can
be supported by values that are deeply entrenched in
liberal societies. It suggests a restriction of individual
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freedom/autonomy if the exercise of the latter puts in
danger the freedom/autonomy of others, as it happens
in the case of the concealed use of PCE.
Reasons related to equity and social interests, therefore,
suggest that there is a moral and social duty to acknow-
ledge the use of cognitive enhancing drugs in competitive-
selective contexts. As we have already noted, in a context
in which personal autonomy has priority, these reasons
are not strong enough to claim that PCE use as such is
morally unacceptable. Furthermore, considering that some
PCE are prohibited by the law, as explained above, the
reasons that lead us to propose the duty of disclosure do
not directly affect the question of legislation, which often
refers to health problems or public order issues that are
not here considered.
In general, prohibiting the use of PCE per se would
amount to a privation of freedom/autonomy and a
reduction of the benefits that they could bring to the
individual and society, which is not justified so far by the
problems caused by cognitive enhancement. However,
introducing a duty of disclosure could be both morally
acceptable and legally feasible, and it would constitute a
more confined limitation of freedom than prohibiting
PCE use in the context in which autonomy is the first
good to consider. PCE disclosure in specific contexts
can be justified by the reduction of the negative effects
of an uncontrolled use of PCE and by the benefits that a
controlled use of PCE would give. In the absence of
serious health hazards produced by the substances in
question, the autonomy of individuals can be considered
the number one concern in the face of some moral
objections to the use of PCE. But other considerations
that here we have tried to develop raise a number of
potential problems at the aggregate level created by un-
controlled use of PCE. The examples we have described
draw some scenarios in which these problems occur
with greater impact. Consequently, it can be argued that
the duty of disclosure, in the form proposed by us, is
more respectful of the autonomy of individuals than the
prohibition of PCE use as such.
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show that there is tension
between the personal use of PCE and the unintended
social consequences of that use. To shed light on this
important issue related to an increasingly widespread
form of cognitive enhancement, we have proposed five
examples. What has emerged is that we value autonomy
and privacy and think that they should be respected in
the most effective way. However, in a liberal society, a
partial reduction of our right to privacy might be neces-
sary in order to preserve the equally important principle
of fairness as well as social safety and efficiency - which an
unregulated use of PCE could threaten. The legitimacy of
this prevision derives from other values deeply entrenched
in liberal societies, such as the restriction of individual au-
tonomy if it endangers that of others. Reasons related to
equity and social interests, therefore, suggest that there
can be a moral duty to publicly acknowledge the use of
PCE in order to limit such potential damages. Indeed,
there are situations in which the use of stimulants might
improve the user’s condition while having composition
effects that turn out to be harmful for the group of refer-
ence or even society as a whole. Many people think that
citizens should be free to use PCE, and banning them is
not a viable option, as it goes against the principle of
autonomy. However, as we have suggested in this paper, a
via media could be found in the duty of disclosure.





1One of the authors has analysed the concept of
autonomy and some of its controversial interpretations
in a number of contexts that could provide further
insights to those interested in the topic, but we decided
not to include such considerations in this work for a
matter of focus [72].
2Such a scheme has been discussed elsewhere, but here
the issue is looked at from a slightly different angle [73].
3It should be acknowledged that the advantages of the
duty to disclose policy we outline are contingent on the
implementation of effective control measures The feasibility
of these surprise tests, their effectiveness and their imple-
mentation will not be addressed here, but suffice to say that
we are not the only ones concerned with ways of bringing
to the surface our “biochemical status” in relation to a test
or job interview. For instance, Barbara Sahakian [7, 9] has
been a fervent supporter of the introduction of tests aimed
at detecting the use of PCE by university students [74–76].
4It should be noted that this argument is often used by
bio-liberals: given that caffeine is also a cognitive enhancing
substance, why should we limit the use of one enhancer
over another? For a more precise analysis see: Julien, Robert
M., Claire D. Advokat, and Joseph E. Comaty [77]. In
particular 361-395.
5We are particularly indebted to one of the reviewers
for underlining the importance of this acknowledgment.
6A similar motivation could be applied to the renowned
cases of cocaine use among surgeons around the world.
However, our intention is to focus on PCE precisely
because – unlike cocaine – they are not illegal drugs.
7In fact, we have not considered contexts (e.g. the army)
in which such practices might be strongly encouraged or
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even required by the authorities [78]. Provided that some-
one’s choice to enter such a context (say, the army) is
expected to have been made competently and without
coercion, even though the compulsory use of PCE might
be seen as limiting the individual’s autonomy, the fact that
it is compulsory for everyone guarantees a fairer treatment
to all the participants. Civil situations, instead, call for a
different kind of attention on how to preserve fairness.
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